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Abstract 
This paper explores the impact of actual exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, which we 
purportedly link to the effect of announcing the peg and to the availability of external funds. 
To stress this point, the focus of the analysis is emerging markets spanning from the 
beginning of the nineties, given the importance of financial integration in the last fifteen years 
and the centrality of external financing for these countries. We empirically show that 
announcing the pegs has deleterious effects on fiscal discipline, while ‘de facto’ pegs which 
have not been announced deliver superior fiscal outcomes. The evidence suggests that this is 
due to the initial positive credibility shock of the announcement, which allows for easier and 
less costly access to the financing of fiscal deficits in emerging countries. 
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1 Introduction 
The financial history of emerging markets in the last fifteen years has been characterized 
by the ebb and flow of capital flows in a period of financial liberalization. Their exponential 
growth in the first part of the nineties, in a context of high global liquidity, allowed for a period 
of high and robust growth. When the flows reversed in the second half of the nineties, a 
series of financial crises ensued, bringing havoc to many of these economies. It is not 
surprising, then, that the choice of exchange rate regimes in emerging economies at that time 
was, in one way or other, closely related to the process of financial liberalization and access 
to the global supply of funds. Two cases stand out. In Asia, the outward oriented growth 
strategy implied –and still implies– a close, although not overtly declared, management of 
exchange rates which kept competitiveness high in spite of the upward pressure that capital 
inflows imposed on the exchange rates. In Latin America, where the recent history had made 
external financing hardly available and credibility was lacking, explicitly fixing the exchange 
rate became the cornerstone of the stabilization and reform programs setup in the aftermath 
of the ‘lost decade’ of the eighties. 
 
The importance of financial integration and its effects over the effective discipline 
imposed by pegs was probably overlooked in some analysis of the benefits of fixed 
arrangements at the beginning of the nineties. This is especially true in the fiscal 
front. By cutting off the inflationary financing of the deficit, pegs were expected to induce 
higher fiscal discipline. However, the expected positive impact of rigid exchange rate 
regimeson fiscal discipline has proven ellusive in the data. Ghosh, Gulde and Wolf (2003) 
sum up the empirical evidence concluding that “[...] greater monetary discipline does not 
translate into fiscal discipline: Countries on pegged regimes ran larger fiscal deficits”. Alberola 
and Molina (2003) arrive at similar conclusions, also when taking into account the effect of 
missing seignioriage in the analysis. 
 
In this context, the aim of this paper is to address some of the deficiencies in the 
previous literature about the effects of exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline, by 
advancing in two directions: first, we develop and test a rational to explain why certain 
exchange rate pegs may erode fiscal discipline; second, since the test of this hypothesis 
requires a careful consideration of actual exchange rate configurations, we take advantage of 
the progress made in classification of exchange rate regimes in the last years. The main focus 
of the analysis is emerging markets spanning from the beginning of the nineties, given the 
importance of capital liberalization and financial integration in the last fifteen years and the 
centrality of external financing for these countries. 
 
The actual exchange rate behaviour and the interaction of public commitments and 
credibility is particularly relevant in our approach. Even after the demise of the majority of 
explicit (‘de iure’) fixed or intermediate exchange rates regime in the second half of the 
nineties, there has been an interest by the authorities to keep stable exchange rates, in the 
form of implicit or non-announced pegs. This preference for exchange rate pegs is a 
remarkable feature of emerging economies which has received increasing attention by the 
literature [Calvo and Reinhart (2002)]. The policy goal of keeping stable exchange rates 
through implicit pegs, or ‘fear of floating’ is explained by competitiveness concerns, the 
existence of liability dollarization and the need to avoid excessive volatility of interest rates, 
combined with the lack of credibility of the authorities, which find it difficult in the long run to 
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commit to and defend an announced peg. On the other hand, the frequency of exchange 
rate crisis implies that some pegging countries have behaved rather as floating regimes. 
Both phenomena create scope for significant differences between a country’s legal (‘de iure’) 
exchange regime and the actual (‘de facto’) behaviour of exchange rates. 
 
Therefore, a general caveat in many analyses of the economic impact of exchange 
rate regimes on economic variables lies in the difficulty to properly identify the actual regime of 
a given country. The most widely available taxonomy of exchange arrangements –published 
by the IMF– is basically a ‘de iure’ classification. Thus, it misses the importance of the ‘de 
facto’ regimes and takes for granted pegs which should be considered as floats. Recently, 
there have been efforts to overcome this situation, among others by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004) (RR, henceforth). A particularly useful feature of RR ‘natural’ classification is that 
it provides a wide taxonomy of regimes in which the actual degree of rigidity is established 
and from which the declared nature of the exchange rate commitment can be partially 
assessed. This is important because both features are theoretically relevant for the disciplinary 
effect of the exchange regime on monetary discipline. 
 
By anchoring more firmly inflation expectations, it would a priori be expected that the 
more rigid the peg and the more explicit the announcement, the stronger would be the 
effect on both inflation and fiscal discipline. In our view, the use of RR ‘natural’ classification, if 
properly interpreted, is bound to improve the quality of the analysis and may change the 
previous conclusions. Indeed, when using this classification, we find a significant positive 
effect of pegs on fiscal discipline, which can be interpreted as supporting the conventional 
hypothesis. However, when exploring the issue in more detail, by considering the degree 
of rigidity of the exchange rate and the impact of  announcing the peg, the results do not hold 
exactly as conventional wisdom would suggest. First, higher rigidity of the exchange rate does 
not significantly translate into stronger fiscal discipline, as it should be reasonably expected 
under the conventional hypothesis. In particular, intermediate regimes fare in general better 
than both fix and floating regimes. Second, and more importantly, the announcement of a 
peg is found to have a deleterious effect on fiscal discipline, while pegs that are not publicized 
do significantly improve fiscal discipline. 
 
These results call for an alternative explanation to solve this apparent paradox. We 
advance an hypothesis based on the effects of pegging the exchange rate on the costs and 
availability of financing, More precisely, by announcing a peg, the economy enjoys better 
financing conditions, which relax the actual fiscal constraints of the authorities and, 
consequently, fiscal discipline. The empirical analysis backs the importance of external 
financing in explaining the deleterious effect of peg announcements on fiscal discipline in 
emerging markets. This suggests that the degree of financial integration is key to our 
hypothesis analysis and we will consider it explicitly in the analysis. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the theoretical link between 
the exchange rate regimes and fiscal discipline is described. Section three deals with the 
construction of the database: two alternative exchange rate classifications are presented and 
the rest of data described. The fourth section presents the main empirical results and the last 
section concludes. 
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2 Exchange rate pegs and their link to fiscal discipline 
Fiscal dominance of monetary policy, which has been traditionally a feature of 
emerging economies, shaped the conventional hypothesis that monetary external anchors 
(e.g. exchange rate pegs) would induce fiscal discipline. By pegging the exchange 
rate the monetary creation process is constrained, monetary seignoriage is reduced and, 
in response, fiscal discipline is expected to be enhanced. When this monetary 
channel to induce fiscal discipline has been tested, it has been far from supported by the 
empirical evidence. Gavin & Perotti (1997), Tornell & Velasco (1998), Calvo & Vegh (1998) and 
more recently Ghosh et al. (2003) have unanimously concluded that pegs do not 
provide higher fiscal discipline in emerging economies. This result is robust to the use of 
different gauges for fiscal discipline: overall or primary balance, even when fiscal balances 
are adjusted to account for seignoriage revenues [as in Alberola & Molina (2003)]. 
 
It should be noted that this conventional theory was based on a rather limited 
framework of analysis, as it only took into account the mechanical effect on the constraints 
on monetary creation, rather than the actual ultimate goal of many exchange rate pegs, which 
is to import credibility through tying authorities’ hands. The credibility gains due to the peg 
tend to enable easier and cheaper access to financial markets and, thus, better conditions to 
finance domestic spending, both private and public. All things given, this easier access 
to financial markets could reduce the incentives of governments to maintain a prudent fiscal 
stance. Furthermore, it is well known that exchange rate based stabilizations lead to an 
increase in domestic demand –the ‘boom’ leg of the boom-bust cycle that has been 
emphasized by the literature [see Calvo and Vegh (1998)]. Typically, higher public spending 
can be financed by increasing revenues arising from the boom. If the increase in public 
expenditure exceeds the final realization of revenues, as could often be the case, fiscal 
discipline can be additionally eroded. This empirical regularity calls for an explicit 
consideration of the effects of the increase in economic activity associated to the peg in the 
empirical analysis. 
 
The compounded impact of these effects of the peg, by loosening the authorities’ 
fiscal constraint, may more than offset the monetary channel in terms of fiscal rectitude, a fact 
that could explain the deleterious impact of rigid exchange regimes over fiscal discipline. 
 
The previous discussion suggests that the way credibility is achieved may matter 
for the fiscal impact of exchange regime choice. In the long run, it is obvious that only 
when the peg is consistent with the underlying policies it will be credible and, thus, 
sustainable. Using the terminology by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzennegger (2005) deeds are in the 
end much more relevant than words. This is the idea behind Krugman (1979) first generation 
of balance of payments models, in which precisely time-inconsistent fiscal laxity of the 
government precipitated the attack on the currency. However, in the short run pegs may 
enjoy some credibility, so as to induce a ‘honeymoon effect’ derived from their 
announcement. To the extent that governments commit their word on the announcements it 
is quite probable that just by announcing the peg there is an initial positive credibility shock, 
mostly when the announcement is also backed by complementary economic measures 
(e.g. stabilization plans, like those set up in Latin America in the late eighties and beginning 
of the nineties). Therefore, at least in an initial phase, words and (or even rather than) 
deeds matter. The fact that both deeds and words count has recently been documented 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 0523 
by Genberg and Swoboda (2004) –when analyzing the expected behaviour of exchange 
rates– and by Vuletin (2004), in the context of fiscal variables. 
 
The combination of time-inconsistency problems and ‘free’ credibility gains from 
announcements creates interesting implications for the expected impact of exchange 
arrangements. For example, it is conceivable that a very rigid ‘de facto’ peg which is not 
announced delivers no credibility at its inception. Notwithstanding this, as long as the 
authorities maintain disciplined policies under a peg which is not announced, they will build up 
credibility. Therefore, when the peg is non-announced, one would be expected to enjoy an 
optimal situation in terms of fiscal discipline: monetary constraint, plus no initial offsetting 
credibility effects, plus incentives to pursue discipline (which are in turn reinforced by the 
factors which explain the fear of floating). Turning the problem upside down, inconsistent but 
announced pegs, which enjoy an initial dilution of fiscal constraints and then fail to deliver 
discipline could potentially result in the worst fiscal results. 
 
Most of our analysis focuses on this kind of implications. In order to separate the 
impact of announcements, however, careful attention must be paid to other dimensions of a 
peg that might also affect credibility. In particular, the rigidity of a peg is also expected to 
impact on credibility. Intuitively, the more rigid is the peg, the higher the monetary constraint, 
but also the larger the initial credibility it is expected to have. Nevertheless, we argue (and the 
data confirm) that most of the positive credibility shock depends on whether the peg is 
announced or not. Because of this, our ranking of a priori expected credibility of the exchange 
rate regimes can be established, from higher to lower as: 
 
1. Announced fix regimes 
2. Announced intermediate regimes 
3. Non-announced fix regimes 
4. Non-announced intermediate regimes 
5. Floats 
 
If the indirect channel we point out (v.g. easing of financing due to the 
announcement) was sufficiently relevant to fully compensate for the potential direct impact of 
exchange regime choice on monetary restraint, the previous credibility ranking would translate 
into the following expected fiscal discipline: 
 
1. Non-announced fix regimes 
2. Non-announced intermediate regimes 
3. Announced intermediate regimes 
4. Announced fix regimes 
 
Note that floating regimes are not unequivocally ranked in this second scheme. They 
are expected to imply less discipline than non-announced pegs since they convey no 
monetary constraints and no credibility effect, but relative to announced pegs the expected 
result is not clear cut. 
 
Our empirical strategy proceeds in three steps. First, we try to provide a more 
detailed look at the usual finding in the literature, investigating what can account for the 
missing impact of exchange arrangements over fiscal discipline and linking it to the use of 
diverse exchange rate classifications. Then, we claim that financial conditions may lie at the 
root of this result. Finally, we check more thoroughly the impact of exchange arrangements 
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over the financial constraints, and we distinguish the effect of announcements and rigidity, 
focusing on emerging markets. 
 
Underscoring the previous remarks is the fact that the choice of exchange rate 
regime and its implementation might depend on expected fiscal outcomes. We are aware that 
this introduces endogeneity in the analysis which must be deal with. Note, however, that the 
expected influence of endogeneity bias is not clear-cut. On the one hand, countries with poor 
fiscal institutions and chronic excessive deficits might resort to pegging the exchange rate in 
order to correct these deficiencies. If this were the case, we would expect to find a negative 
correlation between pegging and fiscal discipline even if pegs had no actual impact over 
discipline. On the other hand, countries which succeed in using the peg to discipline fiscal 
policy are expected to maintain it for a longer time. This survival bias would tend to 
overestimate the positive correlation between pegs and fiscal discipline. Therefore, in the 
empirical analysis these questions must be carefully tackled. 
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3 Data construction 
3.1 Exchange rate classification 
As previously argued, one of the most contentious issues we have to deal with in the paper is 
the definition of the exchange rate regime for each country. In most of the literature, the main 
source of information is the declared exchange rate regime at the IMF, which is publicized 
annually in the International Financial Statistics. Following these criteria fixed exchange rate 
regimes have been  labeled as “Pegged” according to IMF and intermediate regimes are 
matched with “Limited flexibility” regimes. The problem of inconsistency between what 
the countries really do and what they declare at the IMF has been increasingly relevant. 
In particular, in a period where many countries have abandoned their external anchors 
and have declared their currencies to be floating, the “fear of floating” phenomenon 
documented in Calvo and Reinhart (2002)  has become a major focus of analysis. The IMF 
itself recognized this problem in a 1999 publication, reclassifying many countries’ 
arrangements from year to year and admitting that in some cases “countries have a de facto 
regime which differs from its de iure regime” .1 
 
This classification problem has important implications for any economic analysis 
relating exchange rates and macroeconomic variables, as ours. Recent efforts have been 
made to come up with alternative classifications that correct the deficiencies in the IMF data 
or that simply ignore such source. Among this last group is the afore-mentioned paper 
by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005). These authors reclassified de iure exchange rate 
regimes into more refined categories by applying cluster analysis techniques on two variables: 
market exchange rates and central bank’s international reserves.2 
 
We prefer, however, to make use of the ‘natural’ classification by Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2004), since in our view is the most refined and, arguably, the most comprehensive 
classification to date. RR classify a sample of 153 countries in the period 1950-2001, 
applying an identification algorithm to each country and date in order to obtain a realistic 
description of the true exchange rate regime. Very broadly, their approach takes the official 
regime as a starting point and checks its consistency with the observed behaviour of the 
market exchange rate by applying statistical techniques. If both are consistent, that is, 
if deeds match words, the appropriate de iure classification is maintained. Additionally, the 
arrangement is labelled as a pre-announced regime. If this is not the case, the algorithm 
searches for an appropriate de facto regime by looking at the path and volatility observed in 
the exchange rate. Accordingly, the exchange rate arrangement is classified into a new ‘de 
facto’ category of non-preannounced regimes. In this way, RR identify 15 categories, as 
displayed in table 1, ranging from dollarization to freely floating; it is noteworthy that episodes 
with extreme exchange rate volatility and those where parallel exchange rate markets are 
                                                                          
1. Other problem with IMF definition is that its taxonomy has changed over time. In the seventies and eighties the IMF 
classified regimes in three gross categories (pegs, limited flexibility and floating). From 1995 on the definition has been 
refined by the addition of new categories, making it very difficult to build up consistent and reliable time series of 
exchange regimes. Also, this classification does not include some Exchange Rate Based Stabilizations (ERBS) that were 
not instrumented via strictly fixed exchange rates, but rather used crawling pegs or crawling bands, which are labeled as 
“More flexible arrangements” by the IMF. This is the case, for example, of Brazil’s1994 Plano Real, a clear cut ERBS with 
a crawling peg link to the US dollar classified as “More flexible arrangements”. On the contrary, the IMF defines Bolivia 
since 1986 as a floater, although its currency has been depreciating against the US dollar at a much slower pace. 
2. Their paper distinguishes five (inconclusive, float, dirty float, crawling pegs and pegs) or three (float, intermediate 
and fix) categories A country is classified as a float if its exchange rate is relatively volatile and its international reserves 
are relatively stable. Correspondingly, a country that displays high volatility of reserves is classified either as a dirty float, a 
crawling peg or a fixed regime, depending on the volatility of both the level and the variation of the exchange rate. 
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functioning are considered separately, corresponding, respectively to the freely falling3 and 
dual markets categories. 
 
As suggested by RR, the use of de facto exchange rate classifications could in fact 
lead to a reinterpretation of the history of exchange regimes. Indeed, focusing only in official 
exchange rate arrangements results in a surprisingly high number of misclassifications.4 More 
precisely, we can distinguish two types of errors when the IMF ‘de iure’ classification is used 
(see table 2). Paraphrasing the nomenclature of hypothesis testing , type I errors would arise 
when the IMF identifies an exchange rate regime as flexible when it is actually a peg; type II 
errors on the contrary, come up when the IMF takes as a peg an exchange rate which ‘de 
facto’ behaves as a floating or freely falling regime. 
 
Table 2. Types of errors in the IMF classification 
 
 IMF de iure classification 
  Peg Float 
Peg ? Type I error Reinhart & Rogoff 
De facto class. Float / free falling Type II error ? 
 
Obviously, these misclassifications could distort any attempt to analyze the impact of 
exchange regime choice on economic variables. As a prominent example, the introduction of 
de facto classifications has drastically changed the perception about the economic 
performance of floats.5 Also, the bipolar view of exchange rates, which suggests that 
countries will have to choose between extreme pegs or pure floats as the world becomes 
more financially integrated finds surprisingly little support if one focuses on the de facto 
classification: intermediate de facto non-announced regimes still constitute the most common 
choice of exchange arrangement. 
 
As we commented earlier, the RR classification is particularly suited for our 
purposes6 since it distinguishes regimes using the two dimensions we are interested in, 
namely, whether they are announced or not, and their degree of flexibility. We thus 
construct a parsimonious classification in which we collapse RR fifteen natural categories into 
six different groups, as shown in table 1. Graph 1 shows the share of each of these 
categories for the sample period 1970-2001 for the total and for each grouping of 
countries, and also for the sub-sample that we will preferably use in what follows, 1991-2001. 
Note that the share of flexible is highest in the developed countries and that this share is 
really low in developed and emerging markets. On the contrary, the share of  free falling 
is very reduced in developed countries and relevant in the other two sub-categories. We also 
checked our announced category with the IMF classification. There are few differences 
                                                                          
3. Situations where the real exchange rate experiences a very rapid devaluation or inflation exceeds 40% yearly; since 
these situations are not, in principle, the result of a intentional policy, it seems unnatural to consider them as floats. 
4. Even in the fifties, RR found that almost 25% of official pegs were in reality another kind of regime. In the seventies, 
eighties and nineties they found also a high number of pegs that devaluated very often (‘false peggers’). Finally, in 
the period 1991 to 2001 the frequency of false peggers has decreased  but the fear of floating phenomenon took 
preponderance: 25% of declared floaters were not floaters in reality. 
5. RR note that floating seems an unattractive choice when one considers a de iure classification, because countries 
that float grow less and suffer spectacular inflation rates. However, the use of their natural classification leads to 
exclude from floaters situations of freely falling currencies; a correction that results in the finding that floats display, in 
fact, lower inflation and good growth prospects. 
6. Of course, this is not the say that it is without problems. First of all, regimes are classified via a probit analysis of the 
performance of market exchange rates in the previous five years. Because of this, changes in the exchange regime are 
not necessarily related to real changes in policies or specific announcements. Besides that, when Reinhart and Rogoff 
label a regime as a de facto we do not know what was the starting official regime that was rejected by the data, yet it 
could be critical from the point of view of credibility. 
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between our classification of announced regimes and that derived from the IMF publication.7  
In the annex we show the main statistics of our sample by type of regime. 
3.2 Data set 
Our empirical analysis makes use of a panel data set comprising 110 countries, for the period 
running from 1970 to 2001, although, as explained below, we will focus on data of the last 
decade. Countries include 23 OECD developed economies plus 87 developing economies. 
Of these, 24 are European transition countries (plus Cyprus, Malta and Turkey) and ex-Soviet 
Union, another 21 are from Latin America, 24 are from Africa, 14 more from Asia and 4 from 
Middle East.8 Given the wide coverage of countries in both the IMF and RR exchange 
arrangement classifications, the selection is made, basically, upon the availability of sufficiently 
long series of fiscal variables, especially for interest payments. 
 
In terms of the data set, we depart from previous approaches [for example, Alberola 
and Molina (2003) and Ghosh et al. (2003)] in two fundamental points. First, we prefer to test 
our hypothesis in a small sub sample of developing economies with access to international 
private capital markets, the so-called emerging markets. The choice of emerging markets for 
the analysis is consistent with the hypothesis we try to assess, which relies on access to 
international financial markets. This is in line with some recent papers that have dealt with 
the impact of exchange rates over inflation and growth [see Husain et al. (2004)] or fiscal 
balances, such as Vuletin (2004). Emerging economies are identified as those included in the  
definition of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI): countries that have issued some 
kind of public or private debt in international markets, and allow access to its Stock Exchange 
to international investors. This sub-sample includes 25 countries, 7 in Latin America 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela), 9 in Asia (China, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey and Thailand), 4 Eastern European 
countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Russia), 3 in Africa (Egypt, Morocco and 
South Africa), and finally 2 in Middle East (Israel and Jordan).9 Non-emerging developing 
countries and the OECD developed countries are also used in the analysis as control groups. 
 
The second distinguishing feature of our analysis is the use of a shorter database. 
In our view, the use of long samples is hindered by structural changes, which we 
believe have been too profound in the last 15 years as to simply pool the data. As can be 
observed in graph 2 the accession to external financing by emerging markets has grown 
exponentially in the nineties and only in the last years it has moderated. Another gauge for 
financial integration –which will be used in the empirical analysis below–, is the existence of a 
rating from the agencies to developing countries and  emerging markets, which signals the 
disposition of these countries to issue external debt. The graph shows that at the end of the 
nineties and beginning of the nineties the share of developing and emerging markets with 
rating grew exponentially. Now, 60% of the sum of both groups have a ranking today 
                                                                          
7. For example, Thailand before 1997 is labelled as “de facto peg” as the evolution of bath against dollar was very 
stable. But Thailand declared to the IMF that it was implementing a peg to a “secret” basket of currencies. In our view, 
Thailand was, in fact, a pre-announced peg. Another prominent case is Austria since 1991, classified as de facto peg by 
Reinhart and Rogoff and as “peg to a single currency” by the IMF. 
8. OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom and United States. European Transition countries are Albania, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazaksthan, Kyrguiz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. Latin American countries are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. From Africa we consider Algeria, Bostwana, 
Burkina Fasso, Burundi, Cameroon, Republic of Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Senegal, South Africa, Swaziland, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe. Asian countries comprises China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Phillippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Finally in Middle East we took Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and 
Israel. 
9. Taiwan is also included in MSCI index, but no data are available for this country. 
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compared to less than 20% at the beginning of the nineties (by definition, now the  100% of 
emerging markets enjoy a rating). This process of financial integration has been led by the 
emergence of two group of countries, Latin American countries after the debt crisis and 
European transition economies, which returned to international markets searching for 
financing its process of economic transformation and obtaining macro stability via nominal 
external anchors. 
 
More to the point of the paper, it seems obvious that the trend towards the 
internationalization and liberalization of financial markets has completely altered the trade-offs 
involved in pegging the exchange rate from 1970 to the nineties or nowadays. The huge tide 
of capital flows moving from one country to another depending on macro policies and 
credibility is now central in policy decisions, especially, but not exclusively, in the case of 
emerging economies. This was not necessarily the case 30 years ago. Other examples of this 
problem are capital and current account controls: the typical emerging market peg during the 
seventies was usually accompanied by a battery of controls to reinforce the durability of 
the peg. In the nineties, the incidence of these restrictions was substantially lower, especially 
in the case of current account controls. Approximately 60% of emerging economies with 
some kind of peg applied these controls before 1990, and less than 40% after this date; for 
capital account controls, the numbers are 77% and 71%, respectively. 
 
For all these reasons, our estimation sample will be restricted in most cases to the 
period 1991 to 2001, and we will pay particular attention to emerging markets. While this 
choice reduces drastically sample size, it also reduces the (non-negligible) risk of obtaining 
biased conclusions which are not applicable to the current context. 
 
The bulk of data is taken from World Bank’s World Development Indicators 
database, and is completed with IMF’s International Financial Statistics and national 
sources when it is possible. It includes basically three variables: public primary surplus or 
deficit over GDP, interest payments on public debt as a share of GDP and a proxy for the 
cycle, which is used as control. We choose interest payments over GDP as our proxy for 
financial conditions. Increases in interest payments should reflect worsening financial 
conditions, all things given. If the indirect channel we are interested in were significant we 
would expect a disciplining effect of interest payments over the primary surplus. Albeit this 
measure has some potential drawbacks, alternative gauges (such as sovereign bond spreads 
or interest payments over total debt) drastically reduce the sample size. The cycle proxy is 
defined as deviations of the yearly rate of change of real GDP over a long term rate of growth 
(average from 1970 to 2001). We are aware that this is an unsatisfactory choice for a 
proxy, but the high volatility of growth in developing countries makes the use of more 
adequate filters difficult. In any case, the weakness of the proxy must be taken into account 
when interpreting the results. All in all, for the 1991-2001 period, we have around 950 
observations (depending on the precise specification being considered), of which 270 are for 
emerging economies, 430 for the rest of developing and 250 for OECD countries. In the 
annex we present the main statistics of the samples used in the empirical tests. 
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4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 The standard IMF classification 
As stated on the introductory section, most previous studies of fiscal performance under 
alternative exchange arrangements have been based on the IMF de iure classification or 
slightly adapted classifications, and basically all of them fail to prove that pegs provide higher 
fiscal discipline. As a starting point in our analysis, the first column of table 3 roughly 
replicates the results of Ghosh, Gulde and Wolfe (2003) (GGW, henceforth), except for the 
use of ordinary least squares instead of medians. A significant parameter implies that 
the effect of the regime is statistically different from the floating regimes which are used as 
control throughout most of the analysis. 
 
As it can be seen, fixed regimes are worse in terms of fiscal discipline, while 
intermediate and floats are indistinguishable. This and similar results are the basis for 
the standard finding in the empirical literature, when using de iure regimes. The GGW 
results are based on the central government overall fiscal balance. The use of the central 
government balance as a gauge for fiscal discipline is not without drawbacks, beyond the 
fact that provincial or town spending can be very important in many countries. The main 
problem associated with this measure is conceptual. Given that the budget balance is the 
sum of the primary surplus and interest payments, it blurs the distinction between 
policy variables (the primary surplus) and market determined outcomes (interest payments). 
As such, the use of the overall balance does not allow us to investigate whether exchange 
rates have a differential impact on these dimensions and, therefore, makes it impossible to 
test the kind of hypothesis we are interested in. This is the reason we will focus on the primary 
surplus as our preferred gauge for fiscal discipline. Column 2 replicates the GGW result using 
the primary surplus. As can be seen, this change does not alter the essential message of the 
literature: pegged (both fixed and intermediate) regimes seem to reduce fiscal discipline. 
Another consideration which could be important is the bias introduced in the data by not 
taking into consideration the seignoriage revenues, which tend to be proportional to inflation, 
and therefore, higher in floats. However, Alberola and Molina (2003) show that the results hold 
after controlling for seignoriage. 
 
A look at the remaining columns in table 3 shows that, if we focus on ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regressions, the GGW result is clearly dependent on the use of a long sample, 
starting from the 70s. In fact, once we focus on the 90s, it is apparent that there is some 
evidence of a positive impact of exchange regime choice over fiscal discipline, but it is not 
homogenous among countries. In particular, developing countries that pegged their 
exchange rate did indeed show a higher level of fiscal surpluses. On the other hand, 
developed countries’ pegs were not successful in reducing fiscal deficits. Although 
intermediate regimes –whose parameter is positive and marginally significant– rank somewhat 
better than fixed regimes; the equality tests show that the parameters are not statistically 
different. As regards emerging markets, simple means do not suggest any significant impact 
of exchange regime choice over fiscal discipline; moreover in this case, the parameter for the 
intermediate regimes is negative (but very imprecisely estimated) and significantly lower than 
for fixed regime, suggesting that intermediate regimes in emerging markets deliver less 
discipline. All in all, thus, the doubts about the effectiveness of exchange regimes as a 
disciplining device remain valid for emerging economies even if we focus in the last 15 years. 
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Given the somewhat simplistic framework adopted in table 3, endogeneity of exchange 
regime choice with respect to unobservables that might also affect fiscal policy could be an 
issue in the previous regressions. In order to correct partially for this bias, we calculated 
the previous models introducing country dummies. As can be seen in the fixed effects 
column (FE), the results do change for the developing and developed countries sample, but 
for the emerging sample the evidence is mixed. For developed countries, the expected 
impact of fixed and intermediate regimes on fiscal discipline becomes positive. The fact that 
fixed-effects estimates are now positive, suggest that likely peggers among developed 
countries during the nineties exhibited a lower level of idiosyncratic fiscal discipline that was 
partially offset by the disciplining effect of the peg. As regards developing countries, the 
inclusion of country-dummies turns the estimated impact of pegs over the primary surplus 
into negative, although it is statistically insignificant. This suggests that likely peggers among 
developing nations were precisely those countries with better fiscal institutions. On the other 
hand, the results for emerging economies corroborate the impression that fixed regimes have 
not delivered higher discipline, but point to a positive impact of intermediate regimes, 
although the parameters are not statistically different. Thus, the results presented above 
maintain the essential message, namely the lack of clear and systematic evidence that de iure 
peggers among emerging economies perform better in terms of fiscal discipline. This 
contradicts the standard notion that pegs bring about improvements in fiscal discipline in a 
mechanical fashion. The next section investigates how much of this a priori puzzle can be 
explained by using an alternative classification of exchange arrangements. 
4.2 Reinhart and Rogoff’s “natural” classification 
Table 4 presents the corresponding regressions when exchange rate regimes are separated 
according to Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) “natural” classification. Here we take advantage 
of the freely floating category to control for it throughout the analysis. Similar to our previous 
findings, using a long sample blurs any impact from exchange rate regimes on fiscal discipline 
(see the first column in table 4), although intermediate regimes display a significant positive 
parameter in the OLS regression. Once we focus on the 90s, fixed regimes significantly favour 
fiscal discipline, while intermediate regimes lose their significance. Within groups of countries, 
the parameters are positive but non-significant or marginally significant for developed 
countries and developing countries. However, in the case of emerging markets there seems 
to be some evidence that pegs (either by fixing or choosing some intermediate arrangement) 
are significantly correlated with improvements in the primary surplus, and this result is robust 
to the inclusion of country specific intercepts. Note that the disciplining result in emerging 
economies is much more robust for intermediate than for fixed regimes, although, according 
to the p-values of the equality tests, the parameters can not be considered as statistically 
different among both groupings. 
 
Our findings suggest that pegs do now have a positive impact on fiscal discipline in 
emerging economies. The change in our perception about the fiscal effectiveness of pegs 
hinges crucially on the correction of type I errors on the IMF classification accomplished by 
the use of RR classification,10 v.g. de facto pegs that are classified as floats by the IMF. Recall 
that the IMF classification just looks at countries official statements about their exchange 
rate regime and we have seen that announced pegs do not contribute to better fiscal 
performance. Therefore, we can conclude successful pegs (i.e. those that result in a stable 
                                                                          
10. RR also correct for type II errors and exclude from the peg category those announced pegs that behave as freely 
falling. This explanation, however, can not be the main responsible for the differences in the estimated coefficients. 
Remarkably, the proportion of official floats and official intermediate regimes among the freely falling emerging 
economies was roughly equal during the 90s. 
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exchange rate) do improve fiscal discipline but note that this effect is basically attributable 
to non-announced pegs, since announcement seems to dilute this positive effect. 
 
A first potential caveat in the above interpretation is that causality could work in the 
opposite direction. The fact that only non-announced pegs display better fiscal results could 
be taken as evidence that our results are driven by countries that do not deliberately peg their 
currency but follow sound economic policies leading to general economic stability and, in 
particular, low volatility of the exchange rate. 
 
Yet a more thorough look at the classification and the actual policy behaviour behind 
it suggests that this potential source of bias is not relevant in our sample of emerging 
economies. Even the most successful emerging markets are exposed to fairly large external 
shocks that are bound to generate some exchange rate volatility. Therefore, since the RR 
threshold for defining a country as a fix is rather strict,11 we can be quite confident that 
countries classified in this category maintain specific policies aimed at correcting the impact 
of these shocks. In practice, the same holds true as regards RR intermediate regimes. We 
can support this claim, by analysing the behaviour of reserves under different definitions. More 
precisely, the results do not change significantly when we run the regressions in table 4 
restricting the peg (intermediate plus fix) category under RR to include only those countries 
that simultaneously display high volatility of reserves according to the Levy-Yeyati and 
Sturzenegger (2005) classification, that is, those countries which probably manage their 
exchange rate actively.12 As a final check, it is important to note that the mean (and median) 
annual volatility of international reserves is about 2% higher for non-announced intermediates 
regimes than for flexible arrangements, suggesting that they intervene in the exchange rate 
markets.13 These facts are hard to reconcile with the idea that RR non-announced pegs are in 
reality stable floaters and with a problem of reverse causality plaguing our analysis. 
 
This is not to say that sound policies are independent of the management of 
exchange rates, particularly in emerging countries where excessive volatility of exchange rate 
is a cause of great concern.  Actually, as underscore among others by Edwards (2002), 
exchange rate interventions or fear of floating may be the result of a desire to follow some 
optimal Taylor rule. Indeed, this is to some extent  what we are observing in regions like Latin 
America in the last years, where the overall objective of price stability requires avoiding 
excessive swings in the exchange rates. But note that this comment actually reinforces our 
view: countries pursue disciplined policies under the ‘facto’ pegs which are the ‘iure’ floats. 
 
These preliminary outcomes seem to conform to our hypothesis, whereby, in 
emerging economies, the announcement effect tends to soften discipline and is more 
significant than the degree of rigidity of the peg. We now investigate these findings in 
more detail, first by exploring the links between the indirect channel (the financing costs) on 
fiscal discipline, and then, by looking at more detail the implications of the announcement and 
rigidity of the regimes on our results. 
                                                                          
11. A country is classified as a peg if its exchange rate does not change at all during four or more consecutive months or 
if the probability of the exchange rate remaining within a 1% band over a rolling five year period is higher than 80%. 
12. Also, in regressions of annual volatility of international reserves on the level of reserves relative to GDP, openness 
[as in Demarmels and Fischer (2003)] and dummies for exchange arrangements, the dummy for non-announced 
intermediate regimes is generally positive and significant, depending on the specification. Results are available from the 
authors upon request. 
13. This figure is roughly consistent with the results in table-2 of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenneger (2005). 
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4.3 Fiscal constraints and fiscal discipline 
When looking for evidence about the channels through which financial conditions may 
affect the primary surplus, we are actually exploring whether there is a “disciplining” effect of 
worsening financial conditions over fiscal policy. 
 
As with most econometric analysis of macroeconomic variables dealing with 
structural equations from panel data, coefficient heterogeneity, simultaneity in variables and 
the combination of unobservables and dynamics are a potential source of bias in ordinary 
least-squares regressions.  In particular, as it is well known, the presence of any of all of these 
features changes the adequate interpretation for the coefficients estimated by standard 
regression techniques, such as OLS or within-group panel estimators. Nevertheless, since we 
cannot be confident that any particular econometric specification has a clear edge over 
others, we present a battery of alternative results based on commonly used estimators. 
In any event, the essential message remains unchanged regardless of the estimation 
method: emerging economies increase (decrease) their fiscal discipline in response to a 
hardening (easing) of financing conditions. If anything, the consistence among alternative 
methods is relieving from both an economic and an econometric perspective. From an  
economic standpoint, it suggests that the proposed link is sufficiently strong as to be robust 
to different specifications; from an econometric perspective, it indicates that the sort of biases 
and statistical problems hinted above may not be relevant enough.14 
 
Table 5 presents our main results for the whole sample, together with the developed 
countries and emerging groupings. In each specification, we take the primary surplus as our 
dependent variable and analyze its relation with interest payments (our proxy for financing 
conditions). Also we control for the deviation of growth from the country mean and for freely 
falling regimes which can potentially distort the results. 
 
We start our investigation by looking at an ordinary least square regression 
(column 1 for each sample). Due to the aforementioned econometric issues, we would be 
cautious before giving the coefficients in this regression the causal interpretation we are after, 
but nevertheless the estimated parameters are useful for measuring the sign of relevant 
correlations among variables. As can be seen, this preliminary approach confirms that 
financial conditions strongly and positively related with fiscal variables. As expected, higher 
rates of growth also impact positively on fiscal balance in every single case,15 and freely falling 
regimes come hand in hand with a deterioration of the public finances. The fact that 
the relationship between interest payments and the primary surplus is positive suggests the 
presence of a significant “discipline effect”. Note that if  causality went from the primary 
surplus to interest payments we would expect a negative relation between these variables. 
It is also noteworthy that the impact of the interest payments is higher for emerging markets 
than for developed countries, as expected if we sustain that emerging markets fiscal 
behaviour depends more heavily on the financing conditions they face. 
 
This result also holds true if we try to account for the effect of time-invariant 
unobserved country characteristics (such as the quality of institutions or the extent of 
corruption) that may affect both the choice of exchange arrangement and the average 
level of fiscal discipline. As can be seen in the coefficients from standard fixed-effects 
regressions shown in table 5, only for the developed countries sample the coefficient for 
                                                                          
14. If the mentioned econometric problems do not exist, the parameters would be the same for each  estimation method 
15. Note in any case that the elasticity is lower in emerging economies as is to be expected from the higher a priori 
cyclicality of expenditure in emerging markets. 
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interest payments turns negative, implying that once we take country characteristics, the 
coefficient would be consistent with an inverse causality interpretation: higher primary surplus 
are related to lower interest payments. That is precisely the outcome we would expect in a 
standard setting, to which developed countries fit: higher fiscal discipline related to –actually 
inducing– lower financing costs. 
 
The next step is to introduce a more refined measure of the impact of interest 
payments on the fiscal balance, through a GMM approach. On the one hand, since policy 
decisions are subject to considerable inertia and the economic costs of drastic reductions in 
the primary surplus may be substantial, we would like to model some time-dependence in our 
variables. To do so, we introduce the lagged primary surplus as an explanatory variable. Also, 
we would like to acknowledge that interest payments and growth are simultaneously 
determined together with the primary surplus. This requires using appropriate instruments for 
both variables, which in our case exploit the panel dimension of our data. Formally, we 
estimate an Arellano-Bond dynamic fixed-effects model, including the lag of the primary 
surplus. If the error term in the regression is suspected to be correlated with both the interest 
payments and the cyclical position, the model is best estimated using the general method of 
moments (GMM) techniques summarized in Arellano (2003). This estimator exploits the 
assumption that interest payments and growth are predetermined variables with respect 
to the primary surplus, that is, their current values do not depend on future innovations in the 
primary surplus. Note that, under the implicit moment conditions that are used in 
estimation, the estimated coefficients of this models can be given a structural interpretation. 
In particular, they reflect the impact of exogenous increases in interest payments or growth 
over the primary surplus.16 
 
The column GMM in table 5 shows that positive shocks to interest payments 
affect positively the level of the primary surplus, once endogeneity, omitted time-invariant 
factors and dynamics are taken into account through the GMM specification. We view this 
as reinforcing the evidence of a positive structural effect of financing costs on fiscal 
discipline, as envisaged in our central hypothesis (and also on the failure to capture any 
deleterious impact of the cycle on fiscal discipline). As we commented earlier, there is also 
evidence of a higher relevance of interest payments in emerging markets. Also it is 
important to note that the GMM of the structural model that has interest payments as 
dependent variable (not shown) displays a significant negative parameter on the primary 
surplus regressor (as expected, since higher primary surplus should tend to reduce 
financing cost, other things being equal) for developed countries, but the parameter is 
positive (and significant) again in emerging markets. It is also noteworthy to mention that 
growth again has a positive impact on the primary balance, although it is lower for the case of 
emerging markets, which confirm the intuition that their expenditures are more procyclical. 
 
It may be convenient at this point to return to the relevance of financial integration 
for our hypothesis and results. It can be argued that restricting our sample to the emerging 
market countries in the nineties is too rough a way to capture the impact of the process of 
financial deepening in our empirical model. As a matter of fact, not all the considered 
countries ‘emerged’ to the international financial arena at the same time, as we noted when 
discussing the year of rating granting which appeared in graph 2. This variable can be used 
as a proxy for financial integration in the estimation. More precisely, we generate a dummy 
which takes value one since the year in which each country first holds a rating and multiply it 
                                                                          
16. Unfortunately, the time-dimension variation in exchange rate regime variables is insufficient to allow for meaningful 
use of this methodology in estimating the impact of regime choice on fiscal discipline. This limitation is the reason 
why we restrict our attention to OLS and FE estimators in sections 4.1 and 4.2 above and in section 4.4 below. 
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by the interest payments variable, setting up a compounded variable where the proxy for 
financial integration interacts with the interest payment effect. Then we repeat the estimations 
in table 5 (not shown), which measure the impact of the financial constraints on the primary 
balance, adding this compounded variable, but for the whole available period. For the sample 
of emerging countries, the compounded variable is positive for all the three estimation 
methods and significant in the OLS and GMM cases. This indicates that the degree of 
financial integration helps to explain the disciplining impact of interest payments on the 
primary balance. 
 
On account of all things, this battery of results provides in our view a robust 
evidence of the deleterious effect of lower financing costs on fiscal discipline in emerging 
economies. 
4.4 Exchange rate regimes and fiscal constraints in emerging economies 
Up to this point, we have hinted that announcing the regime may relax fiscal discipline 
through the loosening of the financing constraints and that financing costs are statistically 
related to the behaviour of public balances. Now, we attempt to knot these threads together, 
focusing on emerging markets, in order to analyze the importance of announcing the 
exchange regime for fiscal discipline, and review the impact of the rigidity of regimes. In 
table 6 we run regressions for the considered fiscal constraints and the primary surplus on a 
dummy that takes the value of 1 if a regime is pre-announced, using both OLS and fixed 
effect specifications (see footnote 21, to understand the exclusion of GMM in this table). As 
such, the associated parameter must be interpreted as relative to floating plus 
non-announced pegs. The results give some validity to the view that announcements do 
matter for fiscal constraints. 
 
Regarding interest payments, announced pegs pay significantly lower interest 
rates –that is, financing conditions are more favourable, and the impact of announcing the 
regime on the primary surplus is negative and significant. These results convey a rather 
convincing picture: by announcing the peg, financial costs decrease and primary surpluses 
are lower. If we draw a causality inference between both outcomes, announced exchange 
rate regimes, by relaxing the financing constraint also bring about a relaxation of fiscal 
discipline. 
 
Moreover, our results in the next table (table 7) indicate that, once we control for 
the effect of financial costs and growth, announced regimes do not behave in a different 
fashion than non-announced or floats, as far as fiscal discipline is concerned, in any of 
the specifications (OLS, FE, GMM). In our view this result is important to reinforce our 
hypothesis. While it is not possible to rule out other channels, it underscores that the 
reduction of financing costs induced by the announcement toin order is able to explain by 
itself the deleterious effect of announcing the peg on fiscal discipline. 
 
As regards the importance of rigidity, in table 8 we extend the previous analysis to a 
more comprehensive classification of regime types. Relative to floating, only fixed announced 
regimes significantly reduce interest payments.17 Non-announced regimes, on the contrary, 
increase interest payments relative to floating. Moreover, when we look at the direct impact of 
each sub-category on the primary surplus, non-announced regimes display higher fiscal 
discipline, in every case considered. Moreover, point estimates suggest intermediate regimes 
are superior to fixed regimes, in both the announced and non-announced categories. In any 
                                                                          
17. Fixed announced regimes in the sample are only Argentina and Malaysia. Since Argentina was fixed for the whole 
period, this leads to the non-identificability of the fixed-effect coefficient for this regime. 
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case, as previously commented, announced regimes and floating regimes are similar, while 
non-announced are superior to both of them. The above results do not suggest a clear 
prevalence of fixed regimes over intermediate or floating regimes, according to their fiscal 
discipline. On the contrary, if anything, the evidence points to some advantages of 
intermediate regimes. 
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5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have pursued an explanation to the widely documented failure of pegs to 
induce more fiscal discipline in emerging markets. Our strategy has followed two different, 
albeit complementary, venues. 
 
The first venue has been mainly methodological: exchange rate classifications matter 
to ascertain the effect of regimes on fiscal discipline. When using the traditional ‘de iure’ 
classification exchange rate pegs are shown not to provide fiscal discipline and this is a 
robust result. However, when reconstructing the classification to account for the actual 
behaviour of the exchange rate regimes, that is, by trusting more deeds than words, the 
result is reversed. The divergence among both classifications suggests that what dilutes fiscal 
discipline is announcing the exchange regime. 
 
This conclusion points to the importance of credibility and stresses expectation 
effects of the regime announcements in eroding fiscal discipline. In particular, we argue that 
credibility which is achieved by simply announcing the regime and not based on a track 
record of consistent policies tends to dilute fiscal discipline. Why? Because this positive 
credibility effect softens the budget constraint of the fiscal authorities. This channel is bound 
to work more neatly in emerging markets which have observed their access to external 
financial markets grew exponentially since the late eighties, and this is why we focus on our 
analysis in this grouping and in that period. 
 
For these countries, the reduction in the cost of financing deficits arising from 
announcing the regime dilutes the pressures for fiscal discipline, and wekens the fiscal efforts 
by authorities.  The results also highlight that, also contrary to the conventional wisdom, more 
rigidity does not deliver more fiscal discipline. In fact, intermediate regimes seem to perform 
best in terms of fiscal discipline, although the evidence is not too robust. 
 
More precisely, returning to our initial scheme in section 2, we have found evidence 
that in terms of fiscal discipline non-announced pegs are superior than floating regimes, 
which in turn are superior to announced pegs. At the same time, we have not been able to 
provide a thorough ranking of exchange rates depending on their rigidity, although 
intermediate regimes, in general, tend to fare better than fixed regimes. 
 
These results are subject to some caveats. First, by the nature of the data and the 
narrowness of the empirical model, the link between financing costs and fiscal discipline is not 
unequivocally established, although we are rather confident that it exists; second, a better 
treatment of the cyclical position of the economy and its impact on the fiscal discipline would 
be convenient. However, the difficulties to filter out cyclical components in the volatile GDP 
series in emerging economies is a major hindrance. More generally, the frailty of some results 
calls for further study of the empirical model and alternative specifications, so as to deliver 
more robust results, if possible. All these remarks invite for further research. 
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Annex: data and exchange rate classification 
Table A.1. Main statistics of the sample: 1991 to 2001
Developing economies subsample Observations Average Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum
Primary balance (% GDP) 451 0.76 4.33 0.36 -16.55 17.62
          Latin America 129 1.41 3.26 0.87 -7.60 11.63
          Eastern Europe (1) 132 -0.39 3.23 -0.21 -10.24 10.51
          Asia 60 0.51 6.99 -0.68 -16.55 17.62
          Africa 117 1.78 3.75 1.69 -6.24 13.76
          Middle East 13 -1.92 7.89 -4.21 -10.58 13.26
Interest payments (% GDP) 454 2.96 3.00 1.78 0.00 20.20
          Latin America 129 2.91 2.75 1.85 0.49 13.93
          Eastern Europe (1) 132 2.49 2.93 1.44 0.00 20.20
          Asia 60 1.91 2.08 1.29 0.00 6.74
          Africa 119 3.58 2.86 2.82 0.12 14.10
          Middle East 14 7.27 5.30 5.81 1.38 15.22
Total balance (% GDP) 554 -2.30 5.13 -2.22 -45.09 26.90
          Latin America 143 -1.67 2.68 -1.64 -13.25 5.27
          Eastern Europe (1) 150 -2.95 3.24 -2.50 -19.03 2.78
          Asia 66 -1.81 7.33 -3.44 -17.86 16.90
          Africa 180 -2.21 5.13 -2.38 -45.09 11.38
          Middle East 15 -5.18 15.78 -8.28 -25.80 26.90
Real growth (real GDP change) 661 2.18 6.57 3.56 -44.90 38.20
          Latin America 154 3.04 3.30 3.29 -13.18 9.57
          Eastern Europe (1) 192 -0.54 9.67 2.88 -44.90 13.53
          Asia 66 4.16 4.09 4.77 -9.50 12.26
          Africa 227 3.08 3.77 3.70 -11.61 13.79
          Middle East 22 4.87 11.02 3.08 -8.30 38.20
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 661 0.00 5.76 0.24 -38.64 31.20
          Latin America 154 0.00 2.92 0.30 -12.75 6.65
          Eastern Europe (1) 192 0.00 8.82 0.98 -38.64 17.46
          Asia 66 0.00 3.57 0.07 -9.69 7.52
          Africa 227 0.00 3.31 0.12 -14.96 10.44
          Middle East 22 0.00 10.80 -2.75 -11.03 31.20
Developed OECD economies subsample
Primary balance (% GDP) 253 2.44 3.08 2.34 -5.52 10.18
Interest payments (% GDP) 253 4.76 2.74 3.94 0.26 13.91
Total balance (% GDP) 253 -2.32 3.71 -2.39 -13.37 7.09
Real growth (real GDP change) 253 2.78 2.51 2.69 -6.26 13.22
Emerging (MSCI) economies subsample
Primary balance (% GDP) 248 1.36 2.96 1.01 -9.61 10.24
Interest payments (% GDP) 248 3.84 3.03 3.42 0.19 22.88
Total balance (% GDP) 260 -2.56 3.22 -2.22 -15.52 5.00
Real growth (real GDP change) 271 3.64 4.70 4.25 -14.50 17.00
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 271 0.00 4.10 0.47 -17.13 12.01
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(1) Including Cyprus and Malta
(2) Including Turkey.
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Table A.2. Correlations: 1991 to 2001
Developing economies subsample
Primary balance Interest payments Total balance Dev. from long term growth Real growth
Primary balance 1.000 --- --- --- ---
Interest payments 0.192 1.000 --- --- ---
Total balance 0.786 -0.456 1.000 --- ---
Deviation from long term growth 0.047 -0.083 0.124 1.000 ---
Real growth 0.124 -0.127 0.204 0.877 1.000
Developed OECD economies subsample
Primary balance Interest payments Total balance Dev. from long term growth Real growth
Primary balance 1.000 --- --- --- ---
Interest payments 0.193 1.000 --- --- ---
Total balance 0.689 -0.579 1.000 --- ---
Deviation from long term growth --- --- --- --- ---
Real growth 0.281 -0.170 0.359 --- 1.000
Emerging (MSCI) economies subsample
Primary balance Interest payments Total balance Dev. from long term growth Real growth
Primary balance 1.000 --- --- --- ---
Interest payments 0.421 1.000 --- --- ---
Total balance 0.522 -0.554 1.000 --- ---
Deviation from long term growth 0.207 -0.083 0.284 1.000 ---
Real growth 0.172 -0.221 0.386 0.871 1.000
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Table A.3. Main statistics of the sample: developing economies: 1991 to 2001
FIXED REGIMES Observations Average Standard deviation Median Minimum Maximum
TOTAL
Primary balance (% GDP) 117 1.09 3.58 0.75 -10.58 10.51
Interest payments (% GDP) 119 2.95 2.91 1.75 0.12 15.22
Total balance (% GDP) 156 -2.01 4.44 -1.49 -25.80 5.53
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 187 0.69 4.05 0.31 -9.19 15.25
Real growth (real GDP change) 187 3.63 3.46 3.89 -6.90 13.79
ANNOUNCED
Primary balance (% GDP) 85 1.75 3.28 1.66 -5.58 10.51
Interest payments (% GDP) 87 2.20 1.75 1.66 0.12 8.44
Total balance (% GDP) 119 -0.96 2.76 -1.04 -7.05 5.53
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 147 0.07 4.01 -0.29 -11.60 11.96
Real growth (real GDP change) 147 3.57 3.59 3.89 -6.90 13.79
NOT ANNOUNCED
Primary balance (% GDP) 32 -0.67 3.82 -0.49 -10.58 5.67
Interest payments (% GDP) 32 5.00 4.22 4.22 0.84 15.22
Total balance (% GDP) 37 -5.40 6.67 -2.78 -25.80 4.83
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 40 1.73 4.83 0.88 -5.20 15.25
Real growth (real GDP change) 40 3.83 2.98 3.88 -5.88 9.36
INTERMEDIATE REGIMES
TOTAL
Primary balance (% GDP) 209 1.01 4.59 0.57 -10.25 17.62
Interest payments (% GDP) 210 2.69 2.36 1.83 0.36 13.93
Total balance (% GDP) 239 -1.55 5.20 -2.18 -13.25 26.90
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 257 0.56 3.84 0.45 -12.75 31.02
Real growth (real GDP change) 257 3.88 3.91 4.27 -13.18 33.75
ANNOUNCED
Primary balance (% GDP) 14 -2.08 2.50 -1.90 -7.16 2.56
Interest payments (% GDP) 14 3.29 2.06 2.33 1.13 6.37
Total balance (% GDP) 14 -5.38 2.89 -5.33 -9.78 0.81
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 17 -1.03 2.44 -0.70 -7.55 2.94
Real growth (real GDP change) 17 4.54 2.12 4.33 -1.17 9.33
NOT ANNOUNCED
Primary balance (% GDP) 195 1.23 4.63 0.69 -10.25 17.62
Interest payments (% GDP) 196 2.65 2.38 1.79 0.36 13.93
Total balance (% GDP) 225 -1.32 5.22 -2.07 -13.25 26.90
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 240 0.42 4.34 0.38 -14.25 33.45
Real growth (real GDP change) 240 3.83 4.00 4.27 -13.18 33.75
FLEXIBLE REGIMES
Primary balance (% GDP) 47 0.53 4.10 -0.19 -9.29 11.81
Interest payments (% GDP) 47 2.89 3.17 1.77 0.00 13.67
Total balance (% GDP) 57 -2.46 3.99 -2.27 -12.34 11.47
Real growth (deviation from long term average) 73 0.91 4.41 0.74 -11.27 10.96
Real growth (real GDP change) 73 3.21 4.16 3.68 -9.50 11.75
 Table 1. Exchange rate regimes dummies from Reinhart and Rogoff's natural list 
 
 
                            ANNOUNCEMENT
FLEXIBILITY
Announced (de iure) regimes Not preannounced regimes
Observations
Sample (*)
(RR (**))
Fixed regimes 1-No separate legal tender 4.- De facto pegs
2-Pre-announced peg 
3-Pre-announced horizontal band
Intermediate regimes 5-Pre-announced crawling peg 7-De facto crawling peg
6,9-Pre-announced crawling band 8,10-De facto crawling band
11-Moving band
Observations: Sample (*) 239 569
                          (RR (**)) (433) (662)
Flexible regimes 12-Managed floating
13-Freely floating
Free falling 14-Freely falling
15-Dual market
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
(*) Database used in the empirical tests presented in the paper,
including emerging, developing and OECD economies, from 1991-2001.
(**) Original Reinhart and Rogoff's database (from 1991 to 2001)
198
(214)
192
(248)
349
(550)
459
(545)
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Table 3. Fiscal discipline according to the IMF classification  
 
Overall 
Balance 
Primary Balance 
 
All 
countries, 
1970-1999 
All countries, 
1970-1999 
All countries, 
1990-1999 
Developed countries, 
1990-1999 
Emerging economies, 
1990-1999 
Developing countries, 
1990-1999 
 OLS OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
            
Fix -1.02*** -1.82*** -2.31*** 0.65** 0.57 0.59 2.97*** 0.73 0.57 1.14** -0.1 
 (0.26) (0.24) (0.32) (0.33) (0.43) (0.58) (0.88) (0.51) (0.84) (0.53) (0.65) 
Intermediate -0.09 -0.55** -0.72** 0.8*** 0.54 0.82* 2.36*** -0.19 1.1* 1.51*** -0.31 
 (0.28) (0.22) (0.35) (0.31) (0.37) (0.46) (0.77) (0.53) (0.64) (0.57) (0.56) 
Constant -3.67*** 0.97*** 1.26*** 0.91*** 1.04*** 1.56*** 0.52 1.35*** 0.83* 0.09 1.2*** 
 (0.21) (0.18) (0.26) (0.24) (0.26) (0.38) (0.48) (0.41) (0.5) (0.4) (0.39) 
Ho: Fix = 
Intermediate            
p-value 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 0.93 0.66 0.34 0.04 0.44 0.48 0.78 
Observations 2855 2115 2115 778 778 207 207 209 209 362 362 
R2 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 0 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.00 
 
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 
1%  
When testing hypothesis Ho, a value lower than 0.05 is interpreted as a rejection of the 
null hypothesis (introduced in the corresponding line) at the 5% significance level  
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Table 4. Fiscal discipline according to the “natural” classification 
 
  Primary Balance 
 
All countries, 
1970-2001 
All countries, 
1990-2001 
Developed countries, 
1990-2001 
Emerging economies, 
1990-2001 
Developing countries, 
1990-2001 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
           
Fix 0.24 -0.42 0.66** 1.4*** 0.89* -0.55 1.08* 1.22* 0.56 1.76 
 (0.27) (0.37) (0.33) (0.51) (0.46) (0.95) (0.56) (0.71) (0.68) (1.12) 
Intermediate 0.71*** 0.21 0.33 0.65 0.62 -2.79*** 1.36*** 2.05*** 0.48 0.79 
 (0.26) (0.33) (0.33) (0.44) (0.55) (0.94) (0.39) (0.57) (0.67) (0.86) 
Freely Falling -0.99** -2.07*** -1.16** -0.27 . . 0.12 0.55 -0.76 -0.12 
 (0.4) (0.4) (0.51) (0.49) . . (0.82) (0.7) (0.79) (0.79) 
Constant -0.24 0.3 1.17*** 0.72** 1.9*** 3.4*** 0.43 -0.02 0.53 -0.04 
 (0.22) (0.27) (0.27) (0.35) (0.38) (0.63) (0.32) (0.47) (0.59) (0.74) 
Ho: Fix = 
Intermediate           
p-value 0.03 0.03 0.23 0.08 0.57 0.00 0.57 0.20 0.86 0.29 
Observations 2300 2300 952 952 253 253 248 248 451 451 
R2 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.01 0.01 
           
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 
1%  
When testing hypothesis Ho, a value lower than 0.05 is interpreted as a rejection of the 
null hypothesis (introduced in the corresponding line) at the 5% significance level  
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 Table 5. Fiscal constraints and fiscal policy. 1991-2001 
 
 Primary Balance 
 All countries Developed countries Emerging markets 
 OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM OLS FE GMM 
          
Interest Payments 0.36*** 0.4*** 0.47*** 0.26*** -0.46*** 0.46*** 0.49*** 0.74*** 0.62*** 
 (0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) 
Cycle 0.05* 0.19*** 0.15*** 0.43*** 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.2*** 0.1*** 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.1) (0.07) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) 
Freely Falling -1.77*** -0.44 0.08 . . . -1.6*** -0.59 -0.73 
 (0.39) (0.38) (0.54) . . . (0.59) (0.48) (0.6) 
Primary surplus (t-1) . . 0.42*** . . 0.72*** . . 0.39*** 
 . . (0.06) . . (0.05) . . (0.07) 
Constant 0.24 -0.08 0.07** 1.25*** 4.68*** 0.19*** -0.3 -1.39*** -0.08** 
 (0.21) (0.23) (0.03) (0.34) (0.67) (0.04) (0.24) (0.28) (0.04) 
          
Observations 950 950 873 253 253 252 247 247 240 
R2 0.10 0.11  0.14 0.11  0.27 0.43 . 
 
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates; (GMM) 
= Arellano-Bond dynamic fixed-effect estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 
1%  
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Table 6. Announcement effect over fiscal constraints. Emerging markets, 1991-2001 
 
 Interest Payments Cycle Primary Balance 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
       
Announced -0.96** -1.11* -0.14 -1.74 -0.85* -1.45* 
 (0.4) (0.6) (0.75) (1.07) (0.44) (0.73) 
Freely Falling 1.89** 0.43 -2.64*** -4.78*** -1.06 -1.11* 
 (0.85) (0.51) (0.94) (0.94) (0.78) (0.62) 
Constant 3.7 3.92 -0.01 0.5 1.61 1.69 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.27) (0.33) (0.2) (0.21) 
       
Observations 248 248 271 271 248 248 
R2 0.06 0.02 0.05 0.1 0.02 0.02 
 
 
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 
1%  
When testing hypothesis Ho, a value lower than 0.05 is interpreted as a rejection of the 
null hypothesis (introduced in the corresponding line) at the 5% significance level  
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 Table 7. Direct impact of announcement. Emerging markets, 1991-2001 
 
 Primary Balance 
 OLS FE GMM 
    
Interest payments 0.49*** 0.74*** 0.61*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.13) 
Cycle 0.16*** 0.19*** 0.10*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) 
Announced -0.35 -0.29 -0.6 
 (0.42) (0.57) (0.49) 
Freely falling -1.64*** -0.65 -0.91 
 (0.6) (0.5) (0.66) 
Primary surplus (t-1) . . 0.39*** 
 . . (0.07) 
Constant -0.23 -1.33*** -0.08*** 
 (0.26) (0.3) (0.04) 
Ho: Announced = Non-announced    
p-value 0.21 0.09 0.14 
    
Observations 247 247 240 
R2 0.27 0.43 . 
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates; (GMM) = Arellano-Bond dynamic fixed-effect estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 1%  
When testing hypothesis Ho, a value lower than 0.05 is interpreted as a rejection of the null hypothesis (introduced in the corresponding line) at the 5% significance level 
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Table 8. Exchange rates and fiscal constraints. Emerging markets, 1991-2001 
  Interest Payments Cycle Primary Balance 
  OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE 
Announced  -0.17  -0.92 0.84 -0.18 0.33 0  
  (0.45)  (0.67)  (0.94)  (1.17)  (0.5)  (0.79)  
Fix -0.9** .  2 0.35  0.16 . 
   (0.39)  .  (1.5)  (2.84)  (0.34)  . 
Intermediate 0.23 -0.86  0.03 -0.11  0.43 0.16 
   (0.58)  (0.67)  (0.9)  (1.24)  (0.68)  (0.79) 
Non-announced  1.00***  0.31 1.26* 2.58*** 1.49*** 2.29***  
  (0.37)  (0.46)  (0.69)  (0.84)  (0.4)  (0.55)  
Fix 0.06 0.05  0.85 1.74  1.36** 1.49** 
   (0.5)  (0.59)  (0.69)  (1.15)  (0.67)  (0.7) 
Intermediate 1.31*** 0.43  1.41* 2.91***  1.53*** 2.66*** 
   (0.4)  (0.5)  (0.74)  (0.89)  (0.4)  (0.58) 
Freely Falling  2.68*** 2.68*** 0.62 0.66 -1.67 -1.67 -3.2*** -3.1*** 0.12 0.12 0.28 0.39 
  (0.88) (0.89) (0.58) (0.58) (1.1) (1.1) (1.06) (1.06) (0.82) (0.82) (0.69) (0.69) 
Constant  2.91*** 2.91*** 3.69*** 3.62*** -0.99 -0.99 -1.37** -1.42** 0.43 0.43 -0.02 -0.1 
  (0.29) (0.29) (0.39) (0.37) (0.63) (0.63) (0.69) (0.71) (0.32) (0.32) (0.46) (0.44) 
Observations  248 248 248 248 271 271 271 271 248 248 248 248 
R2  0.08 0.10 0.03 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11 
(OLS) = ordinary least square estimates; (FE) = fixed-effects within estimates 
Robust standard errors in parenthesis; *,** and *** denote significance at 10%,5% and 1%  
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 Table 8. Exchange rates and fiscal constraints (contd.). Emerging markets, 1991-2001 
 
 Interest Payments Cycle Primary Balance 
 OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE OLS OLS FE FE 
Ho: Announced = Non-
announced 
p-value  0.00 0.05 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Ho: Fix announced = Fix non-
announced 
p-value  0.04 0.93 0.41 0.63 0.05 0.03  
Ho: Intermediate announced 
= Intermediate non-
announced 
p-value  0.05 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.09 0.00 
 
When testing hypothesis Ho, a value lower than 0.05 is interpreted as a rejection of the null hypothesis (introduced in the corresponding line) at the 5% significance level  
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